Intermediary Balance Sheets and the Treasury Yield Curve

Discussion of Du, Hébert and Li (2023)

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The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the position of the Bank of England.

Motivation and Interpretation

- Pre GFC: OIS swap rate minus Treasury-bond spread (swap spread) positive and Libor-based CIP deviations near zero, across maturities.
- ▶ Post GFC: Swap spread negative and Libor-based CIP deviations positive.
 - Fall in swap spread could be viewed as a fall in the convenience yield on U.S. Treasuries.
- ▶ Instead, authors argue that fall in swap spread, along with the positive CIP deviations, are a natural consequence of a post-GFC regime shift in Treasury market.
 - Expansion of Treasury supply: dealers–who fill residual demand/supply in Treasury market–move from being net-short to net-long Treasuries and swap spread switches sign.
 - Tighter balance sheet constraints: Dealers perform less arbitrage, which has quantitatively important effect on size of both spreads.

Outline of Paper and Key Findings

- ▶ Dealers maximize expected discounted return from 2 arbitrages CIP and Treasury-Swap subject to balance sheet constraint: $q^{syn} + |q^{bond}| \leq \overline{q}$. Assume $q^{syn} > 0$.
- From this, derive Treasury yield curve bounds for Dealers to be willing to be long or short Treasuries in swap-T arbitrage $(y_{n,t}^s \leq y_{n,t} \leq y_{n,t}^l)$.
 - Implies bounds on swap spread $r_{n,t} y_{n,t}$ that are tightly linked to CIP deviation $r_{n,t}^{CIP}$ since dealers indifferent at margin between two arbitrages.
 - Actual Treasury yields closely track dealer-short curves pre-GFC and dealer-long ones post-GFC!
- Embed model into realistic setting with Treasury supply and 2 types of clients who trade with dealers in Treasury and synthetic lending markets.
 - Rationalize patterns of CIP and swap spread Pre- and Post-GFC conditional on whether Dealer's are net-long/short Treasuries, which is determined by Treasury supply (and term premium), and a tightening of balance-sheet constraints of dealers.

Balance-Sheet Costs or Risk Premia?

- ▶ Friction in model is limited balance-sheet space for arbitrage: $q^{syn} + |q^{bond}| \leq \overline{q}$.
 - Risk-based constraints price 70% of CIP deviations (Augustin et al. 2023).
 - CIP deviations increase before regulation (e.g., Basel III) kicks in.

$$r_{n,t} - y_{n,t} \ge r_{n,t} - y_{n,t}^l \simeq -\mathbb{E}_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \Big[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} r_{1,t+j}^{CIP} \Big] \simeq -r_{n,t}^{CIP}$$

- ▶ In data, we know that $r_{n,t}^{CIP} > \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} r_{1,t+j}^{CIP}$ since investors' require risk premium for rollover risk (Du, Hébert, Wang, 2022), which they show using "forward CIP trade"
- ▶ Is there a way to assess to what extent $r_{n,t} y_{n,t} \simeq -r_{n,t}^{CIP}$ is due to balance sheet costs—which are emphasized in this paper—vs a risk premium for the risk that future balance sheet costs could rise.

How about Euro-Area (German) Swap Spreads?





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U.S. minus E.A. 10-Year Swap Spreads

Note. from Corsetti, Lloyd, Marin, Ostry (mimeo), similar trends, but smaller, for 6-Month Spreads.

Decline in Long-Maturity U.S. Treasury CIP deviations



Ostry (BoF)

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U.S. Long-Run Risk and the "End of Privilege"



Note. Long-Run Risk = Equity Prem. (Gordon model) - Term Prem. - CY, (Corsetti, Lloyd, Marin, Ostry (mimeo)) Generalized Alvarez and Jermann (2005) bounds; correlates w/ long-run risk of Schorfheide, Song, and Yaron (2018)

Conclusion

Really nice paper that connects arbitrage deviations across markets!